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Abstract
This article is a prologue to the article “Why Markets are Inefficient:
A Gambling ’Theory’ of Financial Markets for Practitioners and The-
orists” (Moffitt (2017d)). It presents important background for that
article — why gambling is important, even necessary, for real-world
traders, the reason for the superiority of the strategic/gambling ap-
proach to the competing market ideologies of market fundamentalism
and the scientific approach, and its potential to uncover profitable
trading systems. Much of this article was drawn from Chapter 1 of
Moffitt (2017a).
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In theory, there’s no difference
between theory and practice. In
practice, there is.
Walter J. Savitch, computer
scientist and author of Pascal:
An Introduction to the Art and
Science of Programming (1984).
Often incorrectly attributed to
Johannes Snepsheut or Yogi
Berra.a
aThanks to Harry Markowitz for
correcting the original attribution.
Economics consists of
theoretical laws which nobody
has verified and of empirical
laws which nobody can explain.
epigram of Michal Kalecki,
quoted by Steindl (1965), p18.
1 A Practical Approach
Behind most models of mathematical finance lie some really astound-
ing assumptions . . . that everybody is rational, that the law of one
price holds, that no persistent arbitrage is possible, and so on. And
most introductions to investing are either revelations of secret meth-
ods for making millions, or recitations of the immutable laws of cash
flows, risk-adjusted returns and efficient portfolios. But little of this
literature offers credible, general principles to an investor trying to get
an edge in the investment game. Get rich schemes fail the sniff test
— why are these precious secrets being peddled for $34.95? And most
“investing theory” can be trusted only if its assumptions align with
reality (which they do not). The received wisdom of finance today, to
paraphrase something I was told ages ago, is “a magic show and a bag
of tricks.”
Mainstream economic theory’s markets are populated by rational
automatons, but real markets are populated by human beings. Emo-
tions are important. Mistakes abound. And indeed, markets are no
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more efficient than the emotional, mistake-ridden people that comprise
them. To emphasize this point, consider a little tale of the economist
and the gambler.
2 A Tale of the Economist and the
Gambler
An economist and a gambler are presented a puzzle: “A fair coin
turns up heads on 20 consecutive flips. What’s the probability of this
outcome?” The economist, practiced in the art of probability, answers
“1 in 1, 048, 576.” But the gambler answers, quizzically, “It’s not a
fair coin!”
On the surface of it, the economist’s answer seems more sensible
since he interprets the puzzle literally, imagining that fair coins, that
is, ones having a probability of exactly 1{2, exist. He reasons that all
sequences of 20 heads and tails are equally likely, implicitly assuming
independent flips. Thus he arrives at the answer “1 in 1, 048, 576.”
This standard reasoning has been taught to millions of students. But
how many realize its deficiencies?
First, fair coins do not exist in the real world. Ones that are
effectively fair can be manufactured through contrivance and inge-
nuity, but they do not exist in nature nor among coins minted in the
United States. Is an United States penny minted in 1960 fair? Answer:
Indeterminate without additional information, but under reasonable
assumptions explained below, no! 1
Second, the act of “flipping” is ignored in the economist’s version,
but in reality, that act is of crucial importance. If, for example, the
coin is flipped with low angular momentum, then the result will be
strongly biased toward the face that is upward when the coin is flipped!
That is, if the upward face is heads, then heads will occur more often
than tails, but if the upward face is tails, then tails will occur more
often (Diaconis et al. (2007))! And not only does the bias persist
when larger angular momenta are imparted to the coin (the upward
face lands up about 51% of the time with reasonable assumptions on
an upper limit to angular momentum), but in theory and in practice
it never dies out completely! On the other hand, if a U.S. penny
1The Lincoln Head penny of 1960 emphasizes that a real coin, not a hypothetical one,
is unfair. Other years in the Lincoln series could have been specified interchangeably.
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minted in 1960 is spun on its side with a flick of the finger on a level,
flat surface, the probability of tails is about 0.70, that of heads 0.30.
Clearly, then, the instructions on how to randomize the coin, as well
as initial conditions, will affect the outcome.
Here is a little story that actually happened in San Francisco in
1985. A friend of mine who was an options market maker and cham-
pion backgammon player was approached by a man who offered him
offered him 3:2 odds on flips of a coin. My friend would win, say,
$15 when he called the coin correctly, but pay only $10 when he was
wrong. He was what I’d term a “mathematical gambler,” accustomed
to playing against people, both in the options pits and in backgam-
mon, who made inferior “moves.” When he thought he had an edge,
he was quick to pounce. So the “Flipper” began calling the coin that
my friend flipped and my friend won a little at first. When the flipper
then asked to escalate the bet, he agreed. After a bit of back and forth,
the bet size was further escalated, at which point my friend promptly
went on a losing streak that cost $15, 000! The Flipper was a “confi-
dence man,” or “con man” for short, who gained victims’ confidences
in order to rip them off. He appeared for a while in San Francisco and
stung a few traders there, and then vanished as mysteriously as he’d
appeared. There is a saying in the markets and in life — if it’s too
good to be true, it isn’t.
Unlike the economist, the gambler imagines “If I had the oppor-
tunity to bet on head or tail of a coin that has just come up heads
twenty consecutive times, what would I do?” In this interpretation of
the puzzle, few would disagree – “Bet heads on the next flip,” which
from a gambler’s perspective, implies that the coin is unlikely to be
fair.
This difference in approach can be cast in familiar terms. An
economist is a probabilist, a gambler, a statistician. No people en-
ter the financial theorist’s thought; people are always present in the
gambler’s. In the “20 heads of a fair coin,” the gambler admits the
possibility that the puzzle’s presenter is a liar or misinformed, i.e. that
the coin is in actuality unfair.
3 Why Speak of Gambling?
I feel obliged to explain why gambling is being discussed in a serious
article about financial markets. A popular view holds that gambling
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is a vulgar activity that attracts the low-minded, thus having no re-
deeming social value. A friend even joked, “Having gambling on your
resume is a plus only if you want to be a trader.” Gambling is of-
ten thought of as reckless betting, and this caricature is reinforced by
movies of reckless gamblers who lead roller coaster lives, an anathema
to prudent people.
Although ill-favored “gambling” and respectable “investing” have
much in common, the “sophisticated” wealth creation community es-
chews any mention of gambling. Nor is the vulgar gambling idiom,
“bankroll,” ever heard in the stead of “wealth” or “betting” for “trad-
ing.” And academic finance, by and large, has adopted the polite
terms, as if they make the entire enterprise of investing more accept-
able.
Consider this anecdote. My friend Harold, a successful gambler
I’d known for many years was getting married. Several of his old
gambling buddies, myself included, sat together at the ceremony as
the Rabbi introduced the bride and groom. Julia, he said, was from
a respectable family and was honorably employed as a teacher. But
Harold’s avocation, he said, was “professional risk taking.” The word
“respectable” and “gambler” (Is “respectable gambler” an oxymoron?)
did not pass his lips.
Such genteelisms are amusing to professional gamblers who be-
lieve, correctly in my opinion, that high-minded terms like ”investing”
and ”wealth creation” are designed for “suckers,” those investors who
na¨ıvely believe that their money is in the hands of prudent managers.
And this is a dangerous mirage indeed, since “prudent” investment
managers are mostly wandering in the dark with penlights searching
for winners, just like everybody else, and that as a group they achieve
sub par returns.
There is another illusion at work, though. While there are wild
gamblers who leave their fates to the gods, such is most assuredly not
true of professional gamblers. The principles followed by professional
gamblers are as simple to state as they are hard to follow: (1) never bet
without an edge, and (2) bet an amount (possibly zero) appropriate
for that edge.
The paradigm of “20 heads” that opened this article is emblematic
of the difference between the economist and the gambler, pointing
to differences in motivation and methods. The economist seeks to
understand how markets work, but has a bias that markets can’t be
beaten consistently. Since the economist accepts that markets can’t
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be beaten, he conducts no serious investigation of that possibility. The
gambler on the other hand, also cares about understanding markets,
but only for insight on how to gain an edge. And for the gambler,
it is more important to infer that someone made a bad bet than to
understand why.
This article is about the gambler, not the economist. And about
unfair coins, the “Flipper,” and the general question of how to win.
4 On “Economic Arguments”, Efficiency
and Equilibrium
Much of modern financial economics rests on the assumption that most
people are rational. But what if that assumption is wrong? Standard
equilibrium arguments of the form “the price x of an asset must be y
because if it were higher, (rational) traders would sell it down toward
y, or if it were lower, (rational) traders would buy it up toward y” are
then invalid. If this principle fails, the no-arbitrage principle is unjus-
tifiable. The argument for CAPM likewise fails. Markets can still be
efficient without rationality, but the usual justification that relies on
rational arbitrageurs is unavailable. Financial economics makes such
pervasive use of rationality and by extension, equilibrium arguments,
that it’s not clear how much of current theory survives without them.
The basic problem with many “economic” arguments is that they
argue by contradiction — “if such and such were not true, then market
magic would cause it to become true.” I reject this sort of thinking
as magical, not constructive, thinking. It uses a mathematical form
of argument by contradiction, without the mathematical justification
of that form — namely that a proposition can either be true or false
without any exceptions. The form would not be a problem if the
clause “because if it were not true, then somebody would make it true”
holds, but there are obvious logical problems with such statements.
For example, is it even possible for people to devise a remedy, i.e. is
there path or strategy whereby the remedy would be manifested? This
is simply an existence question — does a remedy even exist? Even
if a remedy exists, will someone bother to employ it? Moreover, is
a phenomenon obvious enough to be recognized by somebody? How
can “new” phenomena be discovered if they are already known? These
and other troubling aspects of the magical approach lead me to reject
it in favor of a constructive approach.
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Now back to the main thought: if rationality is absent, can ana-
lytic understanding of financial markets be attained only through the
conjuring of statistical magic?
I think not. Markets can be understood only by dropping the
assumptions of rationality and efficiency in their extreme forms, and
showing that markets still have an inherent order and inherent logic.
But that order results primarily from the “ predictable irrationality”
of investors, as well as from people’s uncoordinated attempts to profit.
The market patterns that result do not rely on rationality or efficiency.
In particular, there is a general failure to understand that myopic,
self-interested actions often lead to self-defeating outcomes, despite
the fact that this has always been a basic feature of markets (Anand
et al. (2013)). It is amazing that this feature is so ill understood,
that it is little discussed in a literature that purports to describe real
markets. The companion article Moffitt (2017d) offers a framework
that captures the order and logic of markets, and which argues that
rationality and efficiency are routinely violated.
5 Approaches to Understanding Mar-
kets
A shortcoming of the financial literature is its general neglect of the
topic of “market philosophies.” Roughly speaking, a market philos-
ophy offers a simple (and often quite inadequate) paradigm of how
markets operate. Most market participants, whether consciously or
not, subscribe to a market philosophy. Therefore, it is important
to understand these philosophies, the thesis being that as viewports
through which investors see the financial world, they are essential to
understanding its operation. Three philosophies and one major vari-
ant thereof are discussed below.
5.1 The Idealistic Approach and Market Fun-
damentalism
Mainstream finance in much of the last half of the twentieth century
was mainly an idealistic study. It postulated that people are rational
without systematically studying their actual behavior, then developed
theory from that assumption — an approach often called market fun-
damentalism. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), for example,
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assumes that almost all people are rational and that they unanimously
agree on prices, so that fair prices result. The development of the EMH
was not based on direct observation of people acting rationally, but
rather from studies of how prices evolve and how markets react to
news. But there are two major problems with this approach. First,
one cannot conclude that because the interactions of many people pro-
duces certain behavior in markets, e.g. martingale prices, that those
behaviors resulted from rationality. There can be other individual
behaviors that could produce similar market outcomes. Second, that
markets act as if rational people produced the prices is quite difficult
to test.
Regardless of its theoretical value, the EMH did capture one as-
pect of agreement between economists and investors — that the mar-
ket is hard to beat. Unfortunately, economists expressed this idea in
the most extreme fashion possible, claiming that the market is im-
possible to beat except by arbitrageurs. The fact that many famous
non-arbitrageur investors and speculators have earned superior returns
over their entire careers is not prima facie evidence against the EMH,
because a few winners should be expected by chance alone.
However, as more evidence against the EMH accumulated in the
1990’s, its defenders relied increasingly on the argument that hidden
risk underlay anomalous phenomena. Thus the mainstay of the EMH,
CAPM, guarantees the fairness not of returns, but of risk-adjusted
returns, so high returns are natural when risk is high. But of course,
high losses are also be expected when risk is high — in this view,
anomalistic winners were just lucky.
But some anomalies are immune to this argument. Lee et al. (1991)
showed that the Closed End Discount Puzzle could not be argued
away by high risk, while a behavioral paradigm offers an intuitively
satisfying explanation. Despite the argument that a few will be lucky,
it is also difficult to reconcile the EMH with the consistent superior
risk-adjusted returns of famous investors such as Warren Buffet and
speculators such as George Soros.
Facing increasing evidence against the EMH, two of its long-time
supporters capitulated, saying in effect, “The market’s not as efficient
as we thought.” But that’s a story to be told elsewhere.
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5.2 The Scientific Approach
The first thorough scientific studies of financial theory were initiated
by psychologists Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky (K&T) and Ver-
non Smith. Over a period of years, K&T performed numerous exper-
iments to learn how people make financial decisions. In 1979, K&T
produced a general formula for their prospect theory based on the
average behavior of experimental subjects. It showed convincingly
that individuals’ decisions are described by prospect theory, not util-
ity theory. Nonetheless, their theory falls short of the ideal, for it
fails to produce unambiguous predictions. But by showing that hu-
man behavior is hardly random, it diminishes the noise trader pillar
of efficient markets.
The most disheartening thing from a scientific standpoint is that
K&T’s work was for many years ignored by economic theorists, and
rational expectations (RE) theories continued to be expounded as if
nothing had changed. But since the late 1980’s things have been
changing, due to the discovery of numerous efficient market anomalies.
In addition, markets events have made it increasingly hard to justify
market efficiency, e.g. the global market crash of 1987, the Dot-com
Bubble of the late 1990’s and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8.
Vernon Smith pioneered the study of economic predictions using
laboratory experiments, a field often called experimental economics.
In important research, Smith studied how participants in auctions
respond to incentives and institutional structure. He found in early
experiments that experimental equilibria were close to those predicted
by theory, and that institutional structure affected the speed of con-
vergence. But in the mid 19801s, Smith et al. (1988) and colleagues
developed more sophisticated protocols, discovering that bubbles and
crashes occurred routinely! And those findings have been corrobo-
rated again and again. Nonetheless, in a tribute to the tenacity (if
not wisdom) of true believers, those findings were discounted because
they often used undergraduate college students, because they were
simplified versions of real markets, and so on.
But not all economists before the late 1980’s were so myopic as
to ignore experimental findings. Hersh Shefrin, Meir Statman and
Richard Thaler, among others, began exploring the implications of
prospect theory to understand investor behavior. They found that
it explained common features of financial decision making — Shefrin
explained investors’ preferences for dividends in equities and the dispo-
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sition effect and Thaler introduced mental accounting and status quo
biases. Today, behavioral finance is an accepted field of economics,
but unfortunately, has yet to fully penetrate the culture and training
of economists and financial professionals.
Physicists began serious studies of markets in the 1990’s, calling
their field “econophysics.” Their approach was quite different from
economists’. In general, scientists start by discovering “empirical reg-
ularities” of a system — this is the observational/experimental stage
of the scientific method. Scientists then develop theories to explain
these regularities; the criterion for a valid theory is that it must make
unambiguous predictions. This is the hypothesis-forming stage of the
scientific method. Each hypothesis so formed is then tested on its
predictions using new data, not whether it conforms to the data that
gave rise to it — this is the verification stage of the scientific method.
Hypotheses that run this gauntlet are tentatively accepted by the sci-
entific community; those that do not are discarded (in principle at
least).
At this writing, econophysics is still in the observational/experimental
stage, with few theories yet formulated. But the research activity is
intense, especially for high-frequency trading, and one should expect
it to enter the hypothesis forming stage in the future.
5.3 Market Personification
Na¨ıve investors have a tendency to endow a market with human emo-
tions, as if through caprice it were at times nice, at others angry: “De-
spite recent choppiness, an optimistic market finished up an agreeable
one half percent.” Not unlike the shenanigans of Greek Gods whose
motives, we are told, lie hopelessly beyond the comprehension of mere
mortals.
Such artistic license may be harmless, but its cousin, the “they”
of market lore, is not. “They took the market down today.” “They
really liked XYZ’s earnings!” Though superficial, these sentiments are
too persistent to be entirely ignored. Their unstated premise, obvi-
ously, is that the market’s puppet-strings are manipulated by power-
ful, if unseen, actors. And investing would then become divination or
the fastidious parsing of pronouncements from acknowledged puppet-
masters (which seems remarkably similar to today’s “FED watching”).
Yet surprisingly, a version of this idea does make sense. In the spirit of
our scientific/statistical/gambling approach, it is based not on whimsy
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or divination, but on an analytical analysis that is presented in the
books Moffitt (2017a,b).
5.4 The Strategic Approach
The strategic approach is essentially a practical, non-ideological one
that draws its inspiration from gambling. Professional gamblers view
the market as a game with a large number of players — they realize
that some players are more informed, more skilled than others. They
realize that some are very poor players. They understand that emo-
tional people usually don’t make good decisions. They realize that
some markets are nearly zero-sum, i.e. futures and options markets
and some are not, i.e. equity markets. In an analysis of equity mar-
kets, gamblers realize that the players includes corporate management,
not just investors and speculators.
There are really only two principles in gambling theory: (1) never
bet unless you have an edge (= positive expected return) and (2) bet
an amount appropriate for that edge. Most long-term losers at games
of chance violate one of these two principles.
Perhaps surprising to economists, most professional gamblers are
pretty much risk neutral (Alevy et al. (2006)). For them, each oppor-
tunity to bet is viewed as an opportunity to maximize expected return;
gamblers prefer many small bets in order to avoid huge swings in cap-
ital. Therefore, professional gamblers make bets in some proportion
to their bankroll (investment funds). If they have a small bankroll,
they make small bets; if they have a large bankroll, they make large
bets. Professional gamblers view their work as one long game. Odds
will change, games will change, competitors will change — but it’s
still just one long game. The secret is to be tolerant to boredom, since
the activity consists of using the same methods with mind-numbing,
ultra-consistency over years and years.2
Not surprisingly, professional gamblers are usually good money
managers. They know that their bankroll is all they’ve got to keep
them in the game. Incidentally, the reason professional gamblers are
largely risk-neutral is that being risk-averse “gives up edge”, while
being risk-seeking needlessly increases risk. There is a difference be-
tween most gambling games and the market. Most gambling games,
2A quote from George Soros, “If investing is entertaining, if you’re having fun, you’re
probably not making any money. Good investing is boring.”
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e.g. poker, involve only a few players. The same game is played repeat-
edly. In single sessions, the game involves the same players. The best
professional gamblers are good at reading people, that is, at guessing
what they’re trying to do. Some behaviors give away what a player
is doing — these are called tells. Interestingly, lots of gamblers have
the same tells! For this reason, gamblers find it plausible that market
participants also have tells.
So, what does all this gambling stuff have to do with markets? A
great deal, actually!
The big difference between the idealistic and the scientific ap-
proaches compared to the strategic approach is that the strategic ap-
proach explicitly views markets as games in which some people use
inferior strategies. The strategic approach explicitly rejects efficient
market ideology as a way of understanding how markets operate. It
replaces this with the view that strategic interaction leads to price
formation, and that the key to understanding markets is understand-
ing how competing strategies lead to prices. Efficient markets are a
byproduct inasmuch as simple trading patterns are so easily exploited
by simple counter-strategies, that they don’t occur in easily recogniz-
able forms.
The point of the market game is to develop strategies that win.
Strategies that are revealed, that is, which can be anticipated — are
candidate inferior strategies.
6 Examples of a Strategic/Gambling
Approach to Markets
We offer several examples of a gambling approach to markets, the cen-
tral topic of the two volume series “The Strategic Analysis of Financial
Markets,” Moffitt (2017a,b).
One rather obvious requirement for getting a gambling edge is
choosing a favorable game. A moment’s thought suggests some cri-
teria that should guide game selection. First, good gamblers should
choose games with weak players. But what constitutes weakness?3 A
few common examples: (1) a (relatively) large group that telegraphs
the strategies they’ll play, (2) a group of players who act on “auto-
3There’s an old poker saying: “Look around the table. If you don’t see a sucker, it’s
you.”
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matic pilot,” using predictable heuristics that don’t engage reflective
cognition, and (3) players (not necessarily traders or investors) who
are constrained to act in a patterned manner, e.g. mutual funds can’t
short stock, the FED is mandated to discuss policy at scheduled meet-
ings, etc. Second, the “weak” players should be sufficiently influential
to move markets — not necessarily the entire market — but at least
a part of it (a stock for instance). Some examples: (1) investors in
IRAs on tax day, (2) decisions by the Federal Reserve on announce-
ment days, and (3) corporate management deciding to raise a divi-
dend. Third, markets sometimes exhibit biases that are important for
trading. In bull markets, for example, it is usual that bad news is
ignored and good news has a (diminishing) positive impact.
Here are three examples of systems that were developed using the
strategic/gambling approach.
The Tax Day Trade
The equity curve of Figure 1 is discussed thoroughly in Moffitt
(2017c). The trade sets up because tax payers procrastinate in
deciding to establish IRAs and flood brokers with money on the
last day (the day taxes are due) to open one. Brokers place those
orders on the next day, causing the S&P 500 to gain about 1/2%
on average.
The Holiday Effect
The holiday effect, a strategy of buying stocks before a holiday
and selling them shortly after the holiday, has been known for a
long time, e.g. Fosback (1976); Hirsch (1987); Lakonishok and
Smidt (1988). Older studies were done mostly in the U.S. mar-
kets, but the effect exists in many countries (Keim and Ziemba
(2000); Ziemba (1994)). Ziemba (2012) presents an analysis that
shows that for U.S. markets in recent years, it has been best to
buy on Day -3 and Sell on Day +2.4
There have always been two explanations for the holiday effects.
The rational explanation is that a few traders sell pre-holiday in
order to reduce risk, thus exerting downward pressure which is
subsequently corrected post-holiday. The “animal spirits” (irra-
tional) explanation is that the warm glow of post-holiday cheer
leads to optimistic trading. Since modern finance is dominated
4Dates are the number of trading days relative to the holiday. Note: In the U.S.,
markets are closed on all the holidays,
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Figure 1: Cumulative returns from buying the S&P 500 index on the close of
U.S. tax day and selling on the close one day later. Commissions and slippage not
included.
by rational theory, it is hardly surprising that the rational ex-
planation holds sway at present.
But a recent article (Gama and Vieira (2013)) uses a “natural
experiment” to reexamine this explanation. The authors note
that the Portuguese stock market was “synchonized” in 2003 to
the European holiday calendar, so that the Portuguese market no
longer ceases trading on most Portuguese national holidays, as it
previously did. Thus the natural experiment: compare market
action on traded (since 2003) Portuguese national holidays to
that before 2003. And . . . surprise, surprise, the price action
around Portuguese national holidays is much as it was formerly!
Thus gamblers accept holiday anomalies as due mainly to animal
spirits, and perform analysis to determine the trading strategies.5
5The rational explanation may play a role, but that seems unlikely. After all, if one
empirically observes excess pre-holiday returns, wouldn’t it be rational to buy, not sell
before a holiday?
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A Risk-Aversion Trade
We won’t describe the details of this trade because it would likely
cause it to cease working, but here is a little information about it.
It is based on investor’s risk aversion; its cumulative returns (not
compounded) for a seventeen year period after fees and slippage
is shown in Figure 2. The system was designed using strategic
principles recommended in the companion paper Moffitt (2017d).
Figure 2: Seventeen years of daily cumulative returns (no compounding) for a
trading system based on risk aversion. It averages 25% per year and has a single
drawdown of about 35% just prior to day 3000. In the portion of the curve from
day 3000 to the end, the worst drawdown was about 12%.
For completeness, we discuss these three examples from the per-
spective of market fundamentalism and the scientific approach. For
each of these three examples, market fundamentalism would argue
that either (1) there is a problem with study design, so that the pur-
ported effects are spurious, or (2) that the effects are too small to be
important to market efficiency or (3) they will be arbbed out soon af-
ter becoming known. Since traders have made (and continue to make)
money) with calendar trading (Ziemba (2012)) and since these effects
have been around for over a hundred years (Lakonishok and Smidt
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(1988)), the only viable explanation is (2). But (2) is problematic
because it admits that traders are irrational!
The scientific view of behavioral finance is that known heuristics
account for the first two “anomalies” but not the third. Neither behav-
ioral finance nor economics considers risk aversion “irrational.” Yet it
is — it gives away money!
7 Summary
This article and its companion Moffitt (2017d) dispense with time-
worn cliche´s6 about rational actors and efficient markets, which have
little to do with how actual market participants behave — arguing
instead that actors are neither rational nor markets efficient. It takes
the view that markets are best understood as the result of strategic
interaction among the participants. In this view, each strategy can
have its day in the sun depending, of course, on the mix of other
strategies it faces. Trading based on fundamental analysis, technical
analysis and arbitrage will be successful, albeit not all the time nor all
at the same time. Market movement occurs only when the transacting
parties use different strategies; markets respond both to “external”
news and to “internal” effects, that is, to secondary effects due only
to strategic interaction, not news.
One cannot gain a durable edge in investing without understand-
ing other participants’ strategies, and a critical component of such
understanding is investor psychology. Thus the new field of behav-
ioral finance is essential for anyone who wishes to invest or speculate
successfully. But one must also understand the basic principles of
game analysis and gambling theory, since most patterned phenomena
in markets have causes both behavioral and strategic.
A experienced trader’s response to this article might be, “Isn’t
this obvious, that good gambling is essential to successful trading?”
My answer: “Yes, it is obvious.” But certain of its consequences are
definitely not obvious. For example, how can you guess — without
any data analysis — that a hypothesized anomaly is like to persist?
The obvious answer according to efficient market thinking, that it
will disappear after discovery, is absolutely wrong!7 Or, how can you
6Has “time-worn cliche´” itself become a time-worn cliche´?
7A colleague communicated that Merton Miller told him that revealed anomalies
wouldn’t disappear immediately, as efficient market theory requires, but would likely take
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guess that a bubble is forming, again without any data analysis? These
are consequences of a strategic analysis, and as I said, they are not
obvious.
It’s time for a revision of market theory. The overwhelming ev-
idence is that markets have never been efficient in the sense of the
efficient market hypothesis. Astute readers will realize that the ghosts
of bygone inefficiencies still haunt us — only their shapes have shifted.
3 years or so. But this is demonstrably wrong, as the case of market momentum demon-
strates.
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